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Friday, August 30, 2013

LAND ACQUISITION ACT SEC. 11 A = if no Award is made within that 2 years period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:=Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: “11-A. Period within which an Award shall be made. – (1) The Collector shall make an Award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no Award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” = the High Court has dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review petition filed by the appellant holding that the LAO/Collector, Land Acquisition having made the Award beyond the period of two years stipulated in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities have lapsed.= whether the doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while interpreting Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act so as to provide for exclusion of time taken for service of copy of the order upon the Collector. Repelling the contention this Court said: “12. The court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. xxx xxx xxx 14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.” 22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we see any apparent omission in Section 11-A to justify application of the doctrine of casus omissus and by that route re-write 11-A providing for exclusion of time taken for obtaining a copy of the order which exclusion is not currently provided by the said provision. The omission of a provision under Section 11-A analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not unintended or inadvertent which is the very essence of the doctrine of casus omissus.-The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act. We, however, make it clear that the declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ petitioners- respondents herein. With those observations, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.

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                         published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40703                        REPORTABLE   ...

Section 302 or Section 304 = whether the offence falls under first part of Section 304 or the second part.= Having regard to the parameters indicated in Gurmukh Singh’s case (supra), the offence seems to fall under the second part. There is no evidence of motive or previous enmity. The incident has taken place on the spur of the moment. There is no evidence regarding the intention behind the fatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. The accused is young. There was no premeditation. The evolution of the incident would show that it was in the midst of a sudden fight. There is no criminal background or adverse history of the appellant. It was a trivial quarrel among the villagers on account of a simple issue. The fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons. There has been no other act of cruelty or unusual conduct on the part of the appellant. The deceased was involved in the scuffle in the presence of his wife and he had actually been called upon by her to the spot so as to settle the score with the accused persons. The deceased had, in the scuffle, overpowered the first accused. That first accused was acquitted. Thus, considering all these aspects, we are of the view that it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with fine of Rs.50,000/-. Ordered accordingly. Since the deceased has been left with a young widow and one child, the amount of fine thus recovered shall be paid as compensation to the widow and the child. In the event of the appellant defaulting to pay the fine, he shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of two years. In case the appellant has already served the term as above, he shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed as above.

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                        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40704  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA          ...
Thursday, August 29, 2013

Hindu Women's Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad agricultural lands not included = The appellants contended that under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad where the lands were situated, the Ist respondent being the widow of deceesed Ramshetti, was not entitled to a share in the joint family agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are excluded from the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. This contention has been negatived by the High Court. Hence the present appeal has been filed by the heirs of Veerappa.= It was submitted that prior to the enactment of the Hyderabad Hindu Women's Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Lands) Act, 1954, the Hindu women's Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952 would not apply to agricultural land. The High Court has rightly negatived this contention. A subsequent Act cannot be used to interpret the provisions of an earlier enactment in this fashion. The language of the earlier Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land also. In the entire Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, there is nothing which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural land. The word 'property' is a general term which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to thee original Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 enacted by the then Central Legislature, entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, which excluded the legislative competence of the Central Legislature over agricultural lands. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women's Right to Property act, 1937, as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgment, therefore, would not apply. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the subsequent Act of 1954 restricted the application of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 brought into force by the earlier Hyderabad Act of 1952. As is pointed out by the High Court, the Act of 1954 was enacted by way of abundant caution, to make sure that the agricultural lands were not considered as excluded from the scope of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952. The second Act is, therefore, clarificatory. The High Court has dealt at length with various decisions of this Court and other Court on thee question of interpretation of the said statute. Since we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court, we are not again examining the cases referred to by the High Court. We, therefore, affirm the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss this appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

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published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=12909 PETITIONER: VAIJANATH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: GURAMMA ...