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Sunday, June 30, 2013

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai- pull down the building numbers 13,14,15 and 16 which are in dilapidated condition. = petitioners have no legal right to continue to live in the existing buildings as this Court by its previous order, sought to be modified, has already passed an order for their eviction from the premises in question.= In view of the existing precarious nature and status of the buildings in question which is informed to be extremely grave, we cannot permit the petitioners to continue to live in the existing buildings for more than a fortnight which they have been ordered to vacate. Therefore, we permit them to exercise their option of shifting either to Mahul, Chembur or the Transit Camps Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight when the transit camps are made fit for habitation with essential and basic amenities. However, if some of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 wish to continue in the existing buildings at their own risk even after a fortnight, they are at liberty to seek permission from the Bench which had passed the order sought to be modified as we have taken up this application for modification only in view of its urgency.- However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances as also taking into account the humanitarian consideration for the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14, we accede to the request of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 communicated through their counsel that if they wish to continue to live in the existing buildings beyond of a period of fortnight until they move the Regular Bench, they may do so at their own risk and in case the buildings in question falls down in the meantime and the occupants suffer loss in any manner, the whole and sole responsibility shall be of the occupants of the those buildings and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai shall not be liable in any manner for any consequence that might follow. 14. The Applicant/respondent No.1 however, shall make the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B habitable with all basic amenities within a fortnight but not later than 30.6.2013. It was further stated by the learned Attorney General that the respondent No. 1 will offer all assistance and logistic support to the evacuees for shifting them from the existing building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 to Mahul, Chembur and continue to live there until they reshift to the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight or till such time when the Transit Camps are complete to their satisfaction. 15. It is made clear that the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B shall provide all basic amenities required for human habitation but the word "habitation" will not be construed so as to insist for fancy fittings in the Transit Camps. = published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp

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'  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 5 OF 2013 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 39114 OF 2012 ...

Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003,-THE OCCUPIER OF THE PREMISES IS ENTITLED FOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN HIS NAME, IF THE OWNER REFUSED TO TAKE CONNECTION IN HIS NAME = Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, is very clear that it is the duty of every licencee to give supply of electricity to the owner or occupier of any premises within its area.= the occupier of the premises is entitled as of her own right under Section 43 to supply of electricity and respondent No. 1 should have ensured that such supply was restored to the petitioner after complying with all necessary formalities as provided under the Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder.= In case, the owner of the premises for any reason is not willing for supply of electricity in his name then the supply shall be made in the name of the petitioner who is the occupant of the premises and the meter shall also be installed in the name of the petitioner and the petitioner will be liable for all charges of consumption of electricity.

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'   PUBLISHED IN  h ttp://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp ITEM NO.18 COURT NO.3 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I...

Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short 'the Rules') = While they were working in the Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short 'the Rules') came into effect. = The Ara Municipal Corporation, however, did not give effect to the Rules until 19th June, 2004 on which date it adopted resolution to give pensionary benefits to its employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards in accordance with the Rules.- the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Rules came into effect on 13-11-1987 but held that as the two writ petitioners had not exercised their option for the pension as required by Rule 4 of the Rules and as their right to pension under the Rules was dependent upon the exercise of their option for pension, they were not entitled for the pension under the Rules. = In the facts of the present case, the Ara Municipal Corporation itself had taken a view that the Rules were not applicable until a resolution is adopted by the Corporation and adopted the resolution only on 19th June, 2004 saying that the pensionary benefits of the Rules will be given to those employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards. The resolution was clearly in contravention of the Rule 1 as well as Rule 4(ii) of the Rules. If the Corporation had taken the correct view that the rules would be effective from 13th November, 1987, the two employees Ramashish Prasad and Vishwanath Ram who were employees of the Ara Municipal Corporation on that date, could have exercised their respective options to switchover to pension scheme under the Rules. This is a case where the Ara Municipal Corporation by taking the view that the Rules were not applicable until adopted by the Corporation had disabled the aforesaid two employees from exercising their option and cannot take advantage of such a disability caused by the Municipal Corporation itself and deny their statutory right to pension under the Rules. Moreover, the two employees have also not received part or whole of provident fund contribution although they have retired in 1996 and 1997 and hence they could not have been deemed to have exercised their option to retain existing provident fund. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and direct that the appellants will be given the pensionary benefits including pension and family pension, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules within three months from today. We make it clear that this judgment has been delivered in the facts of the present case and will not be treated as a precedent applicable to all other cases the facts of which are not before this Court.

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' PUBLISHED IN  http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ...
Wednesday, June 26, 2013

After the California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution, state voters passed a ballot initiative known as Proposition 8, amending the State Constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Respondents, same-sex couples who wish to marry, filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and naming as defendants California’s Governor and other state and local officials responsible for enforcing California’s marriage laws. The officials refused to defend the law, so the District Court allowed petitioners— the initiative’s official proponents—to intervene to defend it. After a bench trial, the court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the public officials named as defendants from enforcing the law. Those officials elected not to appeal, but petitioners did. The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme Court: whether official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the State’s interest in defending the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. After the California Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, the Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing under federal law to defend Proposition 8’s constitutionality. On the merits, the court affirmed the District Court’s order. Held: Petitioners did not have standing to appeal the District Court’s order. Pp. 5–17. (a) Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” §2. One essential aspect of this requirement is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so. In oth-2 HOLLINGSWORTH v. PERRY Syllabus er words, the litigant must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm. Although most standing cases consider whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit, Article III demands that an “actual controversy” persist throughout all stages of litigation. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___. Standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64. The parties do not contest that respondents had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8. But once the District Court issued its order, respondents no longer had any injury to redress, and the state officials chose not to appeal. The only individuals who sought to appeal were petitioners, who had intervened in the District Court, but they had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their only interest was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law. As this Court has repeatedly held, such a “generalized grievance”—no matter how sincere—is insufficient to confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573–574. Petitioners claim that the California Constitution and election laws give them a “ ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’ role in the initiative process,” Reply Brief 5, but that is only true during the process of enacting the law. Once Proposition 8 was approved, it became a duly enacted constitutional amendment. Petitioners have no role—special or otherwise—in its enforcement. They therefore have no “personal stake” in defending its enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of every California citizen. No matter how deeply committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8, that is not a particularized interest sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III. Pp. 5–9. (b) Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Pp. 9– 16. (1) They claim that they may assert the State’s interest on the State’s behalf, but it is a “fundamental restriction on our authority” that “[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant . . . cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410. In Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, for example, a pediatrician engaged in private practice was not permitted to defend the constitutionality of Illinois’ abortion law after the State chose not to appeal an adverse ruling. The state attorney general’s “letter of interest,” explaining that the State’s interest in the proceeding was “ ‘essentially co-terminous with’ ” Diamond’s position, id., at 61, was insufficient, since Diamond was unable to assert an injury of his own, id, at 65. Pp. 9–10. (2) Petitioners contend the California Supreme Court’s determi-Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 Syllabus nation that they were authorized under California law to assert the State’s interest in the validity of Proposition 8 means that they “need no more show a personal injury, separate from the State’s indisputable interest in the validity of its law, than would California’s Attorney General or did the legislative leaders held to have standing in Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72 (1987).” Reply Brief 6. But far from supporting petitioners’ standing, Karcher is compelling precedent against it. In that case, after the New Jersey attorney general refused to defend the constitutionality of a state law, leaders of New Jersey’s Legislature were permitted to appear, in their official capacities, in the District Court and Court of Appeals to defend the law. What is significant about Karcher, however, is what happened after the Court of Appeals decision. The legislators lost their leadership positions, but nevertheless sought to appeal to this Court. The Court held that they could not do so. Although they could participate in the lawsuit in their official capacities as presiding officers of the legislature, as soon as they lost that capacity, they lost standing. Id., at 81. Petitioners here hold no office and have always participated in this litigation solely as private parties. Pp. 10–13. (3) Nor is support found in dicta in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, supra. There, in expressing “grave doubts” about the standing of ballot initiative sponsors to defend the constitutionality of an Arizona initiative, the Court noted that it was “aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.” Id., at 65. Petitioners argue that, by virtue of the California Supreme Court’s decision, they are authorized to act as “agents of the people of California.” Brief for Petitioners 15. But that Court never described petitioners as “agents of the people.” All the California Supreme Court’s decision stands for is that, so far as California is concerned, petitioners may “assert legal arguments in defense of the state’s interest in the validity of the initiative measure” in federal court. 628 F. 3d 1191, 1193. That interest is by definition a generalized one, and it is precisely because proponents assert such an interest that they lack standing under this Court’s precedents. Petitioners are also plainly not agents of the State. As an initial matter, petitioners’ newfound claim of agency is inconsistent with their representations to the District Court, where they claimed to represent their own interests as official proponents. More to the point, the basic features of an agency relationship are missing here: Petitioners are not subject to the control of any principal, and they owe no fiduciary obligation to anyone. As one amicus puts it, “the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and to 4 HOLLINGSWORTH v. PERRY Syllabus whatever extent they choose to defend it.” Brief for Walter Dellinger 23. Pp. 13–16. (c) The Court does not question California’s sovereign right to maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts. But standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law. No matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override this Court’s settled law to the contrary. Article III’s requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in the federal system of separated powers. States cannot alter that role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse. Pp. 16–17. 671 F. 3d 1052, vacated and remanded.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in con...