Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 40 Rule 1 — Appointment of Receiver — Discretionary jurisdiction — Panch Sadachar principles — Delay and absence of urgency — Improper exercise of discretion — Receiver appointment set aside. Where a receiver was appointed in a suit between a Trust and a Society (permissive occupant) despite absence of urgency, imminent danger, or proof of misuse, and where similar issues were already adjudicated in earlier litigation, Held, the trial court failed to apply the “panch sadachar” principles laid down in T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 430. Appointment of receiver after three years of suit filing without emergent circumstances amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion. Held further: Appointment of receiver is a drastic remedy and must be exercised sparingly when the plaintiff shows (i) adverse and conflicting claims, (ii) imminent danger or loss, and (iii) excellent prima facie chance of success. Mere allegations of misuse or defunct status of defendant society are insufficient.

APHC0103832025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 383 of 2025

Between:
The Nellore Progressive Union (Sri Nellore Vardhamana Samajam), represented by its Secretary.
... Appellant / Defendant

And
The Town Hall Trust Board, represented by its Secretary and Trustee.
... Respondents / Plaintiffs

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri C. Subodh
Counsel for the Respondents: Smt. Y.L. Sivakalpana Reddy

HEADNOTES

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 40 Rule 1 — Appointment of Receiver — Discretionary jurisdiction — Panch Sadachar principles — Delay and absence of urgency — Improper exercise of discretion — Receiver appointment set aside.

Where a receiver was appointed in a suit between a Trust and a Society (permissive occupant) despite absence of urgency, imminent danger, or proof of misuse, and where similar issues were already adjudicated in earlier litigation, Held, the trial court failed to apply the “panch sadachar” principles laid down in T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 430. Appointment of receiver after three years of suit filing without emergent circumstances amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Held further: Appointment of receiver is a drastic remedy and must be exercised sparingly when the plaintiff shows (i) adverse and conflicting claims, (ii) imminent danger or loss, and (iii) excellent prima facie chance of success. Mere allegations of misuse or defunct status of defendant society are insufficient.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The plaintiff–Trust filed O.S. No. 239 of 2016 before the Principal District Judge, Nellore, seeking declaration that the termination of permissive possession of the defendant–Society over certain trust properties (Town Hall complex portions) was valid, and for consequential delivery of possession and damages for alleged misuse of property.

2. The defendant–Society, a registered cultural body, was in permissive possession since 1917 under a trust deed (Doc. No.1334/1917) for maintaining a library, reading room, and tennis court.

3. Earlier litigation: in O.S. No. 467 of 2006, the Society obtained permanent injunction restraining the Trust from interference. The appellate court in A.S. No. 9 of 2010 upheld the injunction, recognising the Society’s right to use and lease the premises for cultural, literary, and allied purposes in accordance with the trust deed and bye-laws, while granting liberty to the Trust to file a fresh suit in case of misuse.

4. On that basis, the Trust filed the present suit (O.S. No. 239/2016). During pendency, after three years, it filed I.A. No. 1080 of 2019 under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC seeking appointment of receiver to manage the property and deposit rents, alleging (i) misuse of premises for commercial activities, and (ii) that the Society was defunct and non-functional.

5. The trial court, by order dated 02.04.2025, allowed the application and appointed a receiver, directing management of the property for library, reading, and tennis court purposes only, fixing remuneration at Rs.15,000 per month.

6. Aggrieved, the Society (defendant) preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 383 of 2025 under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC.

CONTENTIONS

Appellant (Society):

• The order violates the settled “panch sadachar” principles in T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty (AIR 1955 Mad 430).

• No urgency, imminent danger, or risk of dissipation shown; allegations are part of the suit itself.

• The application was filed belatedly after three years, showing acquiescence.

• Prior judgments (O.S. No.467/2006 and A.S. No.9/2010) recognised Society’s right to lease the premises for cultural and allied purposes — the same issues cannot be re-agitated through a receiver petition.

Respondents (Trust):

• Property is being misused for commercial purposes; rents are misappropriated by Society members.

• Society failed to cooperate with trial and has become defunct.

• Receiver necessary to safeguard property and apply income strictly per the trust deed.

• Relied on Bhaskar Aditya v. Minati Majumdar, 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 610 = AIR 2003 Cal 178, that appointment of receiver is permissible when just and convenient to prevent misuse.

COURT’S REASONING

1. Principles governing appointment of Receiver:
   Justice Challa Gunaranjan reaffirmed the five classic principles (“panch sadachar”) from T. Krishnaswamy Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 430, for exercising equitable discretion under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC:

   • Adverse/conflicting claims to property.

   • Imminent danger of loss or damage.

   • Urgency requiring immediate court intervention.

   • Plaintiff’s excellent prima facie chance of success.

   • Clean hands, absence of delay, and bona fide conduct.

2. Application to the case:

   • There was no dispute as to ownership or possession; property ownership vested in the Trust and possession in the Society.

   • The alleged misuse or defunct status were issues already in the suit and did not constitute immediate danger warranting interlocutory interference.

   • The application was filed three years after the suit without new circumstances, violating the requirement of urgency.

   • The trial court’s reasoning focused on alleged non-cooperation by the defendant and prior use of premises for public meetings — factors irrelevant for appointment of receiver.

   • Previous judicial findings (O.S. No.467/2006; A.S. No.9/2010) had conclusively held that the Society was entitled to lease the premises for cultural and exhibition purposes. Ignoring these findings amounted to perversity.

3. Exercise of discretion:
   The trial court’s order was found to be mechanical and arbitrary, lacking any finding of (i) excellent prima facie case, (ii) imminent loss, or (iii) urgency. The discretion was not exercised in accordance with judicial principles.

JUDGMENT / CONCLUSION

“The trial Court, ignoring binding findings in the earlier litigation, could not have appointed a receiver merely on allegations already forming part of the suit. No imminent danger or emergency was shown. The discretion exercised is perverse and contrary to the spirit of the ‘panch sadachar’ governing receivership.”

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.04.2025 in I.A. No.1080 of 2019 in O.S. No.239 of 2016 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Nellore, is set aside.

The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed.
No order as to costs.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand closed.

— Challa Gunaranjan, J.
Date: 15.09.2025

ANALYSIS 

This judgment is a textbook reaffirmation of the equitable principles guiding receivership under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC. Justice Challa Gunaranjan meticulously revisits the T. Krishnaswamy Chetty “panch sadachar,” underscoring that:

• Appointment of a receiver is not a matter of course;

• It must rest on urgency, danger, and a strong prima facie case;

• It cannot be used to gain possession indirectly or to prejudge issues pending in trial.

The Court also emphasizes the continuity of findings — when earlier judicial determinations uphold the right of a party to possess or manage property under a trust, later interlocutory orders cannot unsettle those rights absent a demonstrable change in circumstances.

This decision aligns with consistent precedent that receiver appointments are exceptional, not substitutive of adjudication. The analysis also highlights the balance between trust management interests and society’s lawful occupation rights, reaffirming judicial restraint in property disputes with long-standing permissive possession.

FINAL DISPOSITION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 383 of 2025 — Allowed.

• Order appointing receiver (dated 02.04.2025) — Set aside.

• No order as to costs.

• Pending applications — Closed.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 37 — Appeal against arbitral award under National Highways Act, 1956 — Scope of interference — Patent illegality — Public policy. Where the Arbitrator enhanced market value of acquired land from ₹98.84 per sq.m. to ₹148.26 per sq.m., and the Principal District Judge, Chittoor dismissed the challenge under Section 34, Held, appellate court’s interference under Section 37 is limited. No patent illegality or perversity found — Appeal dismissed. National Highways Act, 1956 — Section 3G(7) — Determination of compensation — Guidelines — Application. The Arbitrator may consider surrounding factors such as comparative valuation of horticultural components (mango and coconut trees) when no proximate sales in same village are available. Reference to higher fruit-tree valuations in neighbouring States not illegal if used only for comparative guidance.

APHC010362252025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF AUGUST, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 513 of 2025

Between:
The Project Director, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), Project Implementation Unit, Kancheepuram.
... Appellant / Petitioner

And

1. The District Collector-cum-Arbitrator, for NH Cases, Chittoor District.

2. The Joint Collector-cum-Competent Authority (Land Acquisition), Chittoor.

3. C. Subramanyam, S/o. C. Krishnayya Naidu.
   ... Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Padma Rao Lakkaraju (Standing Counsel for NHAI)
Counsel for Respondent No.3: Smt. C. Jhansi Rani

HEADNOTES

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 37 — Appeal against arbitral award under National Highways Act, 1956 — Scope of interference — Patent illegality — Public policy.
Where the Arbitrator enhanced market value of acquired land from ₹98.84 per sq.m. to ₹148.26 per sq.m., and the Principal District Judge, Chittoor dismissed the challenge under Section 34, Held, appellate court’s interference under Section 37 is limited. No patent illegality or perversity found — Appeal dismissed.

National Highways Act, 1956 — Section 3G(7) — Determination of compensation — Guidelines — Application.
The Arbitrator may consider surrounding factors such as comparative valuation of horticultural components (mango and coconut trees) when no proximate sales in same village are available. Reference to higher fruit-tree valuations in neighbouring States not illegal if used only for comparative guidance.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Land belonging to the 3rd respondent was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 for the purpose of a National Highway.

2. The Competent Authority, by Award dated 24.07.2017, fixed the market value at ₹98.84 per sq.m. and awarded compensation accordingly.

3. The landowner filed an application under Section 3G(5) before the District Collector-cum-Arbitrator, Chittoor, seeking enhancement.

4. The Arbitrator, after considering materials and relevant records, enhanced the market value to ₹148.26 per sq.m..

5. The Project Director, NHAI, challenged this award before the Principal District Judge, Chittoor, by filing Arbitration O.P. No. 294 of 2023, which was dismissed on 20.03.2025.

6. Aggrieved, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 513 of 2025 was filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

CONTENTIONS

For Appellant (NHAI):

• The Arbitrator acted arbitrarily in enhancing market value by 50% without basis or comparable sales.

• Relied upon outdated neighbouring-village sale deeds and extrapolated increase without data.

• Considered tree valuations from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, which was irrelevant for Andhra Pradesh.

• Award violated Section 3G(7) of the NH Act.

For Respondent No.3 (Landowner):

• Arbitrator properly considered all relevant factors, including market disparity and horticultural value, when same-village sale exemplars were unavailable.

• Enhancement is justified and within discretion.

• No patent illegality exists; trial court rightly refused to interfere.

COURT’S REASONING

1. Scope of appeal under Section 37:
   The Division Bench held that the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is co-extensive with Section 34, confined to cases of patent illegality or contravention of public policy. The Court cannot reappreciate evidence as if hearing a regular first appeal.

2. Examination of record:
   It was noted that the Competent Authority itself had fixed value based on sale deeds of neighbouring village over three years old, applying a notional uplift from ₹2.98 lakhs to ₹4.00 lakhs per acre. The Arbitrator, on detailed consideration, further enhanced value by 50%, factoring the number and productivity of fruit-bearing trees (mango and coconut), and disparities in valuation practices among States.

3. No violation of Section 3G(7):
   Section 3G(7) sets out parameters like market value, severance, injurious affection, and displacement costs. The Arbitrator’s reliance on broader comparative references to support enhancement was within those guidelines and not perverse or contrary to law.

4. No patent illegality:
   The Court found that the Arbitrator’s approach did not suffer from non-application of mind or arbitrariness, and thus no ground for interference was made out. The Principal District Judge’s refusal to interfere was correct.

JUDGMENT / CONCLUSION

“We do not find any patent illegality on the face of the Award or any violation of public policy. The Arbitrator has considered the relevant material and given adequate reasons for enhancement of market value. There is no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings.”

Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. The appellant (NHAI) is granted six (6) weeks time to pay the differential compensation to the 3rd respondent-landowner arising out of the award.

No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

— R. Raghunandan Rao, J.
— T.C.D. Sekhar, J.
Date: 18.08.2025

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

This decision reaffirms the narrow revisional scope of judicial interference in highway acquisition arbitration awards under Sections 3G and 37. The Bench carefully distinguishes between an erroneous valuation and an illegal or perverse award, holding that the latter alone invites intervention.

By recognizing the Arbitrator’s pragmatic reliance on comparative horticultural valuation data, the Court underscores that strict uniformity in valuation methodology is neither required nor feasible in the context of fragmented agricultural lands.

The judgment reflects the Court’s consistent line — that enhancement of compensation, even if partly based on equitable considerations, will not be disturbed unless it offends statutory limits or reasoned discretion.

FINAL DISPOSITION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 513 of 2025 — Dismissed.

• Award upheld.

• Appellant to pay differential compensation within six weeks.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending applications closed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order IX Rule 13 — Ex parte decree — Setting aside — Sufficient cause — Absence due to alleged stay outside State — Burden of proof — Lack of diligence. Where the defendant, though duly served and represented through counsel, failed to file written statement and was set ex parte in 2022, but took no steps until after the decree was passed in 2024, his plea that he was away in another State for livelihood was held insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause” under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Held: The appellant’s negligence and prolonged inaction disentitle him to equitable relief. “Sufficient cause” must be shown for the date on which the defendant was set ex parte, not for later circumstances. Application rightly dismissed by trial court — appeal dismissed.

CITATION

Reddi Sriramulu v. Valle Dalamuma & Ors.,
C.M.A. No. 432 of 2025, decided on 09-09-2025 (A.P. H.C.)

— Per Challa Gunaranjan, J.APHC010263762025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

TUESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 432 of 2025

Between:
Reddi Sriramulu … Appellant / Petitioner / Defendant No. 3

And
Valle Dalamuma and Others … Respondents / Plaintiffs / Defendants 1, 2 & 4

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Chinnala Praveen
Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Manikanta Thota and Sri T.V.S. Prabhakara Rao

HEADNOTES

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order IX Rule 13 — Ex parte decree — Setting aside — Sufficient cause — Absence due to alleged stay outside State — Burden of proof — Lack of diligence.

Where the defendant, though duly served and represented through counsel, failed to file written statement and was set ex parte in 2022, but took no steps until after the decree was passed in 2024, his plea that he was away in another State for livelihood was held insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause” under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

Held: The appellant’s negligence and prolonged inaction disentitle him to equitable relief. “Sufficient cause” must be shown for the date on which the defendant was set ex parte, not for later circumstances. Application rightly dismissed by trial court — appeal dismissed.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The respondents/plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 103 of 2018 before the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Srikakulam, seeking partition of joint family properties.

2. The sole defendant (father) having died during pendency, his three sons (including the appellant, Reddi Sriramulu) were impleaded as legal representatives under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC.

3. The appellant, though served and represented, failed to file written statement and was set ex parte in 2022. The other two brothers filed written statements but did not contest the suit effectively.

4. The suit was decreed ex parte on 05.07.2024, granting preliminary decree for partition in favour of plaintiffs.

5. The appellant filed I.A. No. 626 of 2024 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, seeking to set aside the ex parte decree, alleging that he was staying in Karnataka for livelihood after his father’s death and came to know of the decree only on 03.08.2024.

6. The trial court dismissed the application by order dated 25.03.2025, holding that the reasons were insufficient and that the appellant had knowledge of the proceedings and failed to act diligently.

7. Aggrieved thereby, the present C.M.A. No. 432 of 2025 was filed before the High Court.

COURT’S REASONING

1. Nature of inquiry under Order IX Rule 13 CPC:
Justice Challa Gunaranjan recapitulated the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada (2000) 3 SCC 54, emphasizing that “sufficient cause” under Order IX Rule 13 must be liberally construed, but only if the defendant demonstrates absence of negligence or inaction.

2. Application of law to facts:

• The record showed that the appellant had received summons and had engaged counsel.

• He was set ex parte as early as 2022 but remained inactive until 2024.

• The explanation that he was staying in Karnataka for livelihood was not substantiated by any material and was found vague and unconvincing.

• The Court observed that diligence was required at least after being set ex parte, but no steps were taken for nearly two years.

3. Finding:
The Court found no bona fides in the appellant’s explanation, holding that the trial court’s order suffered from no infirmity. The reasons did not amount to “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

JUDGMENT / CONCLUSION

“Order IX Rule 13 CPC postulates that an ex parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that either summons were not duly served or the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing.

In the present case, the appellant had knowledge of the suit, engaged counsel, and was set ex parte in 2022. His subsequent inaction till the decree in 2024 and vague plea of residing outside the State cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The trial court rightly rejected his application. This Court finds no reason to interfere.”

Held: Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending applications closed.

— Challa Gunaranjan, J.
Date: 09.09.2025

ANALYSIS 

This judgment restates the strict responsibility of diligence upon defendants once they are duly served and represented. Justice Challa Gunaranjan emphasizes that mere residence outside the jurisdiction or vague pleas of livelihood difficulties do not absolve a litigant from the obligation to monitor the proceedings.

It further reinforces the settled principle that the phrase “sufficient cause” in Order IX Rule 13 CPC is elastic but not limitless — it cannot cover habitual indifference or unexplained dormancy.

The Court’s reliance on G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada provides doctrinal clarity: sufficient cause relates only to the date of hearing when the ex parte order was made, and not to prior or subsequent negligence.

The decision thus exemplifies judicial consistency in distinguishing between genuine inability and willful negligence, ensuring procedural discipline while preventing misuse of the liberal provisions meant for bona fide litigants.

FINAL DISPOSITION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 432 of 2025 — Dismissed.

• Impugned order (I.A. No. 626 of 2024 in O.S. No. 103 of 2018) — Affirmed.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending interlocutory applications — Closed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2, Order 43 Rule 1, r/w Section 151 — Ad-interim injunction — Grant of ex parte injunction by Lower Appellate Court — Without notice — Improper exercise of discretion — Matter remitted for reconsideration — Directions for status quo. Where the Lower Appellate Court, pending appeal against a decree of dismissal of suit for injunction, granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with possession of plaintiffs, without notice and without limiting the duration of such order, the High Court held that such order was unsustainable.

APHC010381952025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 553 of 2025

Between:

1. Yerri Siva Prathapa Reddy and another.... Appellants / Defendants

AND

1. Bheemacherla Bhaskar Reddy and others... Respondents / Plaintiffs

Counsel for the Appellants: Smt. Kodati Ramya Krishna
Counsel for the Respondents: Sri V. Nitesh

HEADNOTES

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2, Order 43 Rule 1, r/w Section 151 — Ad-interim injunction — Grant of ex parte injunction by Lower Appellate Court — Without notice — Improper exercise of discretion — Matter remitted for reconsideration — Directions for status quo.

Where the Lower Appellate Court, pending appeal against a decree of dismissal of suit for injunction, granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with possession of plaintiffs, without notice and without limiting the duration of such order, the High Court held that such order was unsustainable.

Held:
Order passed without hearing the opposite party and without limiting its duration amounts to improper exercise of jurisdiction. Matter remitted to the Lower Appellate Court for fresh determination on merits after hearing both sides. Parties directed to maintain status quo till disposal.

CITATION STYLE

Yerri Siva Prathapa Reddy & Anr. v. Bheemacherla Bhaskar Reddy & Anr.,
C.M.A. No. 553 of 2025, decided on 15-10-2025 (A.P. H.C.) — per Challa Gunaranjan, J.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The respondents/plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 4 of 2019 before the Junior Civil Judge, Jammalamadugu, seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants (present appellants) from interfering with their possession of the suit schedule property.

2. The suit was contested and dismissed by judgment and decree dated 26.03.2025, the Trial Court holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish possession, and that declaration of title was necessary to resolve the dispute.

3. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed A.S. No. 51 of 2025 before the II Additional District Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, and pending appeal, they filed I.A. No. 409 of 2025 under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC, seeking ad-interim injunction.

4. The Lower Appellate Court, by order dated 16.06.2025, granted ad-interim injunction ex parte, without issuing notice to the appellants.

5. The defendants (present appellants) challenged the said order before the High Court under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, by filing the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 553 of 2025.

6. On 06.08.2025, this Court had passed an interim order suspending the injunction, which was later extended.

CONTENTIONS

Appellants’ submissions:

• The suit having been dismissed after full trial, there was no injunction in force during the suit, and hence the appellate court erred in granting a fresh injunction contrary to findings of the trial court.

• The plaintiffs were found not in possession, and such finding could not be overridden ex parte.

• The appellate court’s action violated principles of natural justice as the order was passed without notice and without time limitation.

Respondents’ submissions:

• Appeal proceedings are continuation of the original suit; hence interim relief can be granted to protect subject matter.

• Findings of trial court can be reappreciated in appeal.

• Denial of interim injunction would defeat purpose of appeal.

• The appellants were trying to disturb possession by erecting structures under cover of suspension orders.

JUDGMENT

(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan)

The Hon’ble Judge observed:

“On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the same was passed without hearing the respondents in the said I.A. However, the Lower Appellate Court, instead of confining the interim order for a specific period, has granted injunction pending disposal of the appeal. This approach is unjustified.”

The Court noted that since the appellants had already filed a counter affidavit opposing the injunction, the proper course would be to remit the matter for reconsideration after hearing both sides.

The Court also took note of apprehensions from both sides that attempts were being made to take possession during pendency of appeal, and therefore, directed both parties to maintain status quo till fresh disposal by the lower appellate court.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

“Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.06.2025 passed in I.A.No.409 of 2025 in A.S.No.51 of 2025 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the Lower Appellate Court for reconsideration.

The Lower Appellate Court shall consider I.A.No.409 of 2025 in A.S.No.51 of 2025 and pass appropriate orders after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties, within a period of three (03) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

Till such time, the parties shall maintain status quo as observed above.

With the above observations, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.”

— Challa Gunaranjan, J.
Date: 15.10.2025

ANALYSIS 

This judgment underscores the judicial restraint expected in granting ex parte interim injunctions, particularly in appellate proceedings arising from dismissed suits.

The Hon’ble Court has correctly emphasized that:

• Interim injunctions, especially those granted ex parte, must be time-bound and subject to hearing the opposite party;

• The continuation of litigation through an appeal does not automatically justify interim relief overriding trial court findings; and

• Courts must adhere to principles of natural justice and proportionality while exercising discretion under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

FINAL DISPOSITION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 553 of 2025 — Allowed.

• Impugned order (I.A. No.409 of 2025 in A.S. No.51 of 2025) — Set aside.

• Matter remitted for reconsideration on merits within three months.

• Status quo — To be maintained by both parties.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Sections 13(1)(ia) & (iii) — Ex parte decree of divorce — Application to set aside ex parte decree — Delay of 94 days — Condonation of delay — Liberal approach in matrimonial cases — Principles reiterated. Where the wife suffered serious burn injuries and health issues and failed to contest the H.M.O.P., resulting in an ex parte decree of divorce, and she filed an application to set aside the decree along with one seeking condonation of delay of 94 days, the trial court dismissed both applications. The High Court, on appeal, held that in matrimonial matters, the Court should adopt a pragmatic rather than pedantic approach when the delay is short and supported by bona fide reasons, particularly where medical evidence is subsequently produced to substantiate illness.

APHC010290522005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF SEPTEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 555 of 2025

Between:
Donthireddy Pravallika, 
... Appellant / Respondent

AND

Donthireddy Veera Reddy, 
... Respondent / Petitioner

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. Burla Siva Rama Krishna
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr. K.H.V. Siva Kumar

JUDGMENT

(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ninala Jayasurya)

HEADNOTES

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Sections 13(1)(ia) & (iii) — Ex parte decree of divorce — Application to set aside ex parte decree — Delay of 94 days — Condonation of delay — Liberal approach in matrimonial cases — Principles reiterated.

Where the wife suffered serious burn injuries and health issues and failed to contest the H.M.O.P., resulting in an ex parte decree of divorce, and she filed an application to set aside the decree along with one seeking condonation of delay of 94 days, the trial court dismissed both applications. The High Court, on appeal, held that in matrimonial matters, the Court should adopt a pragmatic rather than pedantic approach when the delay is short and supported by bona fide reasons, particularly where medical evidence is subsequently produced to substantiate illness.

Held:
Considering the short delay and medical reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing the application was unsustainable. Delay of 94 days condoned; ex parte decree set aside; matter remitted for fresh consideration.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The respondent-husband filed H.M.O.P. No.117 of 2023 under Section 13(1)(ia) and (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Narasaraopeta, seeking dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty and mental disorder.

2. The wife, Donthireddy Pravallika, did not appear before the trial court, allegedly due to serious health issues and burn injuries, leading to an ex parte decree of divorce on 18.08.2023.

3. She subsequently filed I.A. No. 24 of 2024 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree, accompanied by I.A. No. 23 of 2024 to condone the delay of 94 days in filing the application.

4. The trial court dismissed both applications by common order dated 25.04.2025, holding that the petitioner failed to file any medical records or convincing evidence along with the applications to explain the delay.

5. Aggrieved, she filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 555 of 2025 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

COURT’S REASONING

• The Division Bench heard Mr. Burla Siva Rama Krishna for the appellant-wife and Mr. K.H.V. Siva Kumar for the respondent-husband.

• The appellant contended that the delay occurred solely due to serious illness and burn injuries, which prevented her from approaching counsel earlier. Although such material was not filed before the trial court, the same was now placed on record in the appeal.

• The respondent’s counsel opposed the appeal, supporting the trial court’s view that no sufficient cause was established before the lower court.

• Upon examining the record, the Bench noted that while the appellant had indeed failed to contest the original proceedings properly, the new material placed before the appellate court established her bona fide incapacity during the relevant period.

• The Court emphasized that in matrimonial cases, courts must lean towards substantial justice and adopt a pragmatic approach, especially when the delay is short and the rights of the parties are personal in nature, not commercial.

• The Bench further observed that no counter-affidavit was filed by the husband disputing the medical material placed on record in appeal.

CONCLUSION / OPERATIVE ORDER

“As it is an issue pertaining to divorce and the delay is only 94 days, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Trial Court should have adopted a pragmatic approach rather than a pedantic one in the interest of parties.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. The order in I.A. No.24 of 2024 in H.M.O.P. No.117 of 2023 is set aside, and the said I.A. stands allowed.
No order as to costs. Consequently, all pending applications shall stand closed.”

— Ninala Jayasurya, J.
— Tuhin Kumar Gedela, J.
Date: 22.09.2025

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

This judgment reinforces a liberal and equitable approach in matrimonial litigation, aligning with consistent precedents of the Supreme Court and High Courts holding that technicalities should not defeat substantive justice between spouses.

By condoning a brief delay of 94 days, the Court prioritized conciliation and adjudication on merits over strict procedural compliance. The Bench notably underscored that in such personal disputes, a pragmatic approach must prevail over a pedantic one, reflecting the judicial philosophy in family law where human considerations outweigh procedural lapses.

FINAL DISPOSITION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 555 of 2025 — Allowed.

• Order in I.A. No.24 of 2024 in H.M.O.P. No.117 of 2023 — Set aside.

• Delay of 94 days — Condoned.

• Ex parte decree of divorce — Set aside.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.