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ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

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Saturday, November 12, 2011

defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS




defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS

defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS




defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS

defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS




defacto complainant not turning up for giving evidence even after 6 six years, her whereabouts not known, other witnesses are hearsay evidence, speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused- entire proceedings quashed. - JUDGEMENTS

Rape ?= easy virtuous character = living separately after the incident with her husband shows not easy virtue like wise injuries on her body clearly discloses she was raped giving complaint after consulting her husband and uncle on the next day is not delay. (JUDGEMENTS)



Rape ?= easy virtuous character = living separately after the incident with her husband shows not easy virtue like wise injuries on her body clearly discloses she was raped giving complaint after consulting her husband and uncle on the next day is not delay. (JUDGEMENTS)

abetment of suicide ? - committing suicide as the accused inquired about her chastity - not amounting to abatement of suicide - JUDGEMENTS


abetment of suicide ? - committing suicide as the accused inquired about her chastity - not amounting to abatement of suicide - JUDGEMENTS

Saturday, November 5, 2011

IN MOTOR ACCIDENT CASE IF DEATH OCCURED , THE DEPENDANTS WEEP, IF PERMANENT DISABILITY OCCURED, THE VICTIM ALONG WITH HIM ALL HIS DEPENDANTS HAVE TO WEEP EVERY DAY - MISRABLE SITUATION , WHILE FIXING COMPENSATION COURT MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION OF THIS FACT.


                                                                NON-REPORTABLE




                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                        CIVIL APPEAL No.9014 OF 2011


                    (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.30556 of 2009)




Govind Yadav                                                 .......Appellant


                                         Versus




The New India Insurance Company Limited                      .......Respondents 










                                  J U D G M E N T








G.S. Singhvi, J.








1.    Leave granted.




2.    The appellant has approached this Court because he is not fully satisfied 




with   the   enhancement   granted   by   the   High   Court   in   the   amount   of 




compensation   awarded   by   9th  Additional   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal, 




Jabalpur (for short, `the Tribunal').








3.    In the petition filed by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 




1988 (for short, `the Act'), which came to be registered as MVC No.59 of 2005, 




the appellant prayed for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.10,70,000/- 



                                                                                            2






with   interest   @   18%.     The   appellant's   claim   was   founded   on   the   following 




assertions:




       (i)      That   he   had   suffered   grievous   injuries   in   an   accident   which 




                occurred   on   14.11.2004   when   the   mini   bus   in   which   he   was 




                working as Helper overturned due to rash and negligent driving by 




                the driver Shri Abdul Ahmad Musalman.




       (ii)     That he was initially treated at Government Hospital, Seoni from 




                where he was shifted to Nagpur Medical College.  He remained in 




                the   hospital   from   14.11.2004   to   2.1.2005   and   15.2.2005   to 




                20.3.2005.  Due to infection, his left leg was amputated above the 




                knee.  Thereafter, he was treated at National Hospital, Jabalpur.




       (iii)    That at the time of accident his age was about 24 years and he was  




                drawing monthly salary of Rs.4,000/-.




       (iv)     That on account of amputation of leg, he lost the job and his future 




                was bleak.  










4.     The owner and the driver of the vehicle did not contest the claim of the 




appellant,   but   the   respondent   insurance   company   did   so.   In   the   written 




statement filed on behalf of the respondent, it was pleaded that the accident was 




not caused due to rash and negligent driving of the mini bus and, in any case, 



                                                                                               3






the insurer was not liable to pay compensation because the driver of the mini 




bus did not have valid driving licence.  










5.     After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced by 




them the Tribunal held that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent 




driving of the mini bus by its driver.  However, the Tribunal did not accept the  




appellant's version that he was working as a Helper and was getting salary of 




Rs.4,000/-   by   observing   that   he   had   not   produced   any   evidence   to   prove   the 




factum of employment and monthly emoluments.  The Tribunal then referred to 




the Second Schedule of the Act and determined the amount of compensation by 




assuming  the appellant's income  to be Rs.15,000/- per annum.    The Tribunal 




was of the view that due to 70% disability, the appellant would suffer loss of 




income  to the tune of Rs.10,500/- per annum.    The Tribunal then applied the 




multiplier of 17 and held that the appellant is entitled to Rs.1,78,500/- towards 




loss of future income.  The compensation awarded by the Tribunal under other 




heads was as under:




1)     Mental agony and physical pain caused due to 


       amputation of the leg and other injuries                               Rs.25000/-


2)     Medical expenses                                                       Rs. 3300/-


3)     Expenditure incurred on nutritious food and 


       transportation during treatment                                        Rs.10000/-


4)     Loss of earning due to accident and entertainment


       from normal earning                                                    Rs.10000/-


5)     Cost of artificial leg                                                 Rs.30000/-



                                                                                            4










The Tribunal also awarded interest at the rate of 6% on the total compensation 




of Rs.2,56,800/-. 










6.     The appeal preferred by the appellant against the award of the Tribunal 




was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by granting an  




enhancement   of  Rs.50,000/-.    In  the   opinion  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,   the 




income of the appellant, who was working as Cleaner at the time of accident 




could be taken as Rs.2000/- per month i.e. Rs.24,000/- per annum and the loss 




of income due to 70% permanent  disability would be Rs.16,800/- per annum. 




He   also  applied  the  multiplier   of 17  and  held  that  the   appellant  is entitled  to  




compensation   of   Rs.2,85,600/-   towards   future   loss   of   income.     The   learned 




Single Judge added Rs.20,400/- towards conveyance charges, special diet and 




medical   expenses   and   concluded   that   the   appellant   is   entitled   to   total 




compensation of Rs.3,06,000/- with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from 




the date of application.                   










7.     Shri Rajnish K. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the 




compensation   awarded   by   the   Tribunal   was   wholly   inadequate   and   the   High 




Court   committed   serious   error   by   not   granting   appropriate   enhancement 




keeping in view the fact that on account of the permanent disability suffered by 



                                                                                          5






him, the appellant will not be able to get suitable employment and lead normal 




life.   He further argued that the Tribunal and the High Court gravely erred in 




not awarding just and reasonable compensation  for future treatment including 




cost of artificial leg which will require periodical replacement.  










8.     Shri   S.L.   Gupta,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent,   supported   the 




impugned judgment and argued that the appellant has failed to make out a case 




for further enhancement in amount of compensation.










9.     We have considered respective submissions.   This   Court   has,   from   time 




to time, expressed concern over the increasing number of motor accidents and 




pendency of large number of cases involving adjudication of claims  made  by 




the legal representatives of the deceased and also by those who suffer injuries 




and disabilities of various types as a result of accidents. The statistics compiled  




by   Transport   Research   Wing   of   Ministry   of   Road   Transport   and   Highways, 




New Delhi show that between 2004 and 2008, more than 5,00,000 people lost 




their lives and about 22,60,000 people were injured.   The table containing the 




details of road accidents in India (2004-2008) as published in the report titled 




"Accidental   Deaths   and   Suicides   in   India,   2008"   by   National   Crime   Records 




Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs is reproduced below:



                                                                                                                                            6






Sl.     Year    Road           %             Persons        %             Persons          %             No.           of     %                  Rate


No              Accidents      variation     injured        variation     killed   (in     variation     vehicles   (in       variation          of 


                (in            over          (in            over          nos.)            over          thousands)           over               Deaths


                thousand)      previous      thousands)     previous                       previous                           previous           Per


                               year                         year                           year                               year               Thousand


                                                                                                                                                 Vehicles


                                                                                                                                                 (Col.7/


                                                                                                                                                 Col.9)


 (1)    (2)             (3)          (4)             (5)          (6)         (7)                (8)            (9)                 (10)                (11)




  1     2004       361.3             7.4        413.9             8.1       91,376               8.2       66,289*                    -                  1.4




  2     2005       390.4             8.0        447.9             8.2       98,254               7.5       66,289*                    -                  1.5




  3     2006       394.4             1.0        452.9             1.1      1,05,725              7.6      72,718@                   9.7                  1.5




  4     2007       418.6             6.1        465.3             2.7      1,14,590              8.4       72,718#                    -                  1.6




  5     2008       415.8             -6.7       469.1             0.8      1,18,239              3.2      89,618@                   23.2                 1.3










         The   above   noted   figures   do   not   include   the   accidents   which   are   not 




reported to the police and other governmental agencies.










10.      The   personal   sufferings   of   the   survivors   and   disabled   persons   are 




manifold.  Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the 




times it is not possible to do so.  If an individual is permanently disabled in an  




accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high.  In  




cases   involving   total   or   partial   disablement,   the   term   `compensation'   used   in 




Section   166   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   (for   short,   `the   Act')   would 




include   not   only   the   expenses   incurred   for   immediate   treatment,   but   also   the 




amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment/care necessary for a 




particular injury or disability caused by an accident.     A very large number of 




people   involved   in   motor   accidents   are   pedestrians,   children,   women   and 



                                                                                                   7






illiterate persons.  Majority of them cannot, due to sheer ignorance, poverty and 




other   disabilities,   engage   competent   lawyers   for   proving   negligence   of   the 




wrongdoer   in   adequate   measure.   The   insurance   companies   with   whom   the 




vehicles involved in the accident are insured usually have battery of lawyers on  




their panel.   They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical 




objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their 




liabilities   minimized.     This   results   in   prolonging   the   proceedings   before   the 




Tribunal.  Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses' make the award passed 




by   the   Tribunal   and   even   by   the   High   Court   (in   appeal)   meaningless.     It   is, 




therefore,   imperative   that   the   officers,   who   preside   over   the   Motor   Accident 




Claims   Tribunal   adopt   a   proactive   approach   and   ensure   that   the   claims   filed 




under   Sections   166   of   the   Act   are   disposed   of   with   required   urgency   and 




compensation   is   awarded   to   the   victims   of   the   accident   and/or   their   legal 




representatives   in   adequate   measure.     The   amount   of   compensation   in   such 




cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In R.D. 




Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Private Limited (1995) 1 SCC 551, this Court 




while  dealing   with   a   case   involving   claim   of   compensation   under   the   Motor 




Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward  v.  




James (1965) 1 All ER 563, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th  Edition, Volume 




12 (page 446) and observed:



                                                                                                  8






       "Broadly   speaking   while   fixing   an   amount   of   compensation 


       payable   to   a   victim   of   an   accident,   the   damages   have   to   be 


       assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. 


       Pecuniary   damages   are   those   which   the   victim   has   actually 


       incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of 


       money;   whereas   non-pecuniary   damages   are   those   which   are 


       incapable   of   being   assessed   by   arithmetical   calculations.   In 


       order   to   appreciate   two   concepts   pecuniary   damages   may 


       include   expenses   incurred   by   the   claimant:   (i)   medical 


       attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; 


       (iii)   other   material   loss.   So   far   non-pecuniary   damages   are 


       concerned,   they   may   include   (i)   damages   for   mental   and 


       physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to 


       be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of 


       amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on 


       account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or 


       sit;   (iii)   damages   for   the   loss   of   expectation   of   life,   i.e.,   on 


       account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned 


       is   shortened;   (iv)   inconvenience,   hardship,   discomfort, 


       disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life."


                




       In the same case, the Court further observed:






       "In its very nature whenever a tribunal or a court is required to 


       fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves  


       some   guesswork,   some   hypothetical   consideration,   some 


       amount   of   sympathy   linked   with   the   nature   of   the   disability 


       caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with 


       objective standards."








11.    In Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v.  Prasanth S. Dhananka (2009) 6 




SCC   1,     the   three-Judge   Bench   was   dealing   with   a   case   arising   out   of   the  




complaint filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.   While enhancing the 




compensation awarded by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 



                                                                                                            9






from Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.1 crore, the Bench made the following observations which 




can appropriately be applied for deciding the petitions filed under Section 166 of 




the Act:




       "We must emphasise that the court has to strike a balance between the 


       inflated   and   unreasonable   demands   of   a   victim   and   the   equally 


       untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable. 


       Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the way of  


       making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the court must 


       not   be   chary   of   awarding   adequate   compensation.   The   "adequate 


       compensation"   that   we   speak   of,   must   to   some   extent,   be   a   rule   of 


       thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult 


       to satisfy all the parties concerned.




       At the same  time  we often find that a person injured in an accident 


       leaves   his   family   in   greater   distress   vis-`-vis   a   family   in   a   case   of 


       death.   In   the   latter   case,   the   initial   shock   gives   way   to   a   feeling   of 


       resignation and acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move 


       on.   The   case   of   an   injured   and   disabled   person   is,   however,   more 


       pitiable   and   the   feeling   of   hurt,   helplessness,   despair   and   often 


       destitution enures every day. The support that is needed by a severely 


       handicapped person comes at an enormous price, physical, financial 


       and emotional, not only on the victim but even more so on his family 


       and   attendants   and   the   stress   saps   their   energy   and   destroys   their 


       equanimity."


                                                                           (emphasis supplied)










12.    In   Reshma   Kumari   v.   Madan   Mohan   (2009)   13   SCC   422,   this   Court 




reiterated   that   the   compensation   awarded   under   the   Act   should   be   just   and   also 




identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount 




of compensation.  The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below:



                                                                                             1






"The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. 


While   the   claimants   are   required   to   be   compensated   for   the   loss   of 


their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. 


Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose 


sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only  


son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms.






The   question   as   to   the   methodology   required   to   be   applied   for 


determination  of  compensation   as  regards prospective  loss  of  future 


earnings,   however,   as   far   as   possible   should   be   based   on   certain 


principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have 


become   eligible   to   promotion   immediately;   there   might   have   been 


chances   of   an   immediate   pay   revision,   whereas   in   another   (sic 


situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have 


continued  in  service;   his chance   of promotion,   having  regard  to  the 


nature   of   employment   may   be   distant   or   remote.   It   is,   therefore, 


difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied 


in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been 


suggested   that   some   sort   of   hypotheses   or   guess   work   may   be 


inevitable. That may be so.






In   the   Indian   context   several   other   factors   should   be   taken   into 


consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of 


job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, 


future   prospects   may   have   to   be   taken   into   consideration   not   only 


having   regard   to   the   status   of   the   employee,   his   educational 


qualification;   his   past   performance   but   also   other   relevant   factors, 


namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the 


private   companies   these   days.   In   fact   while   determining   the 


m
  ultiplicand   this   Court   in   O
                                    riental   Insurance   Co.   Ltd.    v.   Jas
                                                                                 huben  


held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from 


which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken 


into consideration.






One   of   the   incidental   issues   which   has   also   to   be   taken   into 


consideration   is   inflation.   Is   the   practice   of   taking   inflation   into 


consideration   wholly   incorrect?   Unfortunately,   unlike   other 


developed countries in India there has been no scientific study. It is 


expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. 



                                                                                                         1






        In   India   it   does   not   happen.   It,   therefore,   may   be   a   relevant   factor 


        which   may   be   taken   into   consideration   for   determining   the   actual 


        ground   reality.   No   hard-and-fast   rule,   however,   can   be   laid   down 


        therefor."


                                                                         (emphasis supplied)










13.     In Arvind Kumar Mishra v.  New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 




10   SCC   254,   the   Court   considered   the   plea   for   enhancement   of   compensation 




made   by   the   appellant,   who   was   a   student   of   final   year   of   engineering   and   had  




suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident.  After noticing factual matrix of the 




case, the Court observed:






          "We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in relation 


          to  assessment   of  all damages  for personal  injury.  Suffice   it to say  


          that   the   basis   of   assessment   of   all   damages   for   personal   injury   is 


          compensation.  The   whole   idea   is   to   put   the   claimant   in   the   same 


          position   as  he   was   insofar   as   money   can.   Perfect   compensation   is 


          hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim has done 


          no   wrong;   he   has   suffered   at   the   hands   of   the   wrongdoer   and   the 


          court must take care to give him full and fair compensation for that 


          he had suffered."


                                                                         (emphasis supplied)










14.     In Raj Kumar v.  Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, the Court considered some 




of the precedents and held: 






        "The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("the Act", for short) 


        makes   it   clear   that   the   award   must   be   just,   which   means   that 


        compensation   should,   to   the   extent   possible,   fully   and   adequately 


        restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of 


        awarding   damages   is   to   make   good   the   loss   suffered   as   a   result   of 



                                                                                               1






wrong   done   as   far   as   money   can   do   so,   in   a   fair,   reasonable   and 


equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the 


damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation 


or   fancy,   though   some   conjecture   with   reference   to   the   nature   of 


disability and its consequences, is inevitable.  A person is not only to 


be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he 


suffered   as   a   result   of   such   injury.   This   means   that   he   is   to   be 


compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy 


those   normal   amenities   which   he   would   have   enjoyed   but   for   the 


injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could 


have earned. 






The heads  under which  compensation   is  awarded  in  personal  injury 


cases are the following:


    Pecuniary damages (Special damages) 


    (i)   Expenses   relating   to   treatment,   hospitalisation,   medicines, 


    transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.


    (ii)   Loss   of   earnings   (and   other   gains)   which   the   injured   would 


    have made had he not been injured, comprising:


        (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;


        (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.


    (iii) Future medical expenses.


    Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) 


    (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of 


    the injuries.


    (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).


    (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).


    In   routine   personal   injury   cases,   compensation   will   be   awarded 


    only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of 


    injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the 


    evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under 


    any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future 


    earnings   on   account   of   permanent   disability,   future   medical 


    expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) 


    and loss of expectation of life."


                                                                    (emphasis supplied)



                                                                                                1










15.    In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar  Mishra v. New 




India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra) and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra) 




must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the 




quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled 




either   permanently   or   temporarily.     If   the   victim   of   the   accident   suffers 




permanent   disability,   then   efforts   should   always   be   made   to   award   adequate 




compensation   not   only   for   the   physical   injury   and  treatment,   but  also   for   the 




loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which 




he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.










16.    We   shall   now   consider   whether   the   compensation   awarded   to   the 




appellant   is   just   and   reasonable   or   he   is   entitled   to   enhanced   compensation 




under any of the following heads:






       (i)       Loss of earning and other gains due to the amputation of leg.






        (ii)     Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.






       (iii)     Future medical expenses.






       (iv)      Compensation for pain, suffering and trauma caused due to 


                  the amputation of leg.






       (v)       Loss of amenities including loss of the prospects of marriage. 



                                                                                               1






       (vi)    Loss of expectation of life. 










17.    A brief recapitulation of the facts shows that in the petition filed by him 




for   award   of   compensation,   the   appellant   had   pleaded   that   at   the   time   of 




accident   he   was   working   as   Helper   and   was   getting   salary   of   Rs.4,000/-   per 




month.  The Tribunal discarded his claim on the premise that no evidence was 




produced by him to prove the factum of employment and payment of salary by 




the   employer.     The   Tribunal   then   proceeded   to   determine   the   amount   of 




compensation in lieu of loss of earning by assuming the appellant's income to 




be Rs.15,000/- per annum.   On his part, the learned Single Judge of the High 




Court assumed that while working as a Cleaner, the appellant may have been 




earning Rs.2,000/- per month and accordingly assessed the compensation under 




the first head.  Unfortunately, both the Tribunal and the High Court overlooked 




that at the relevant time minimum wages payable to a worker were Rs.3,000/- 




per   month.     Therefore,   in  the   absence   of  other   cogent  evidence,   the   Tribunal 




and the High Court should have determined the amount of compensation in lieu 




of   loss   of   earning   by   taking   the   appellant's   notional   annual   income   as 




Rs.36,000/- and the loss of earning on account of 70% permanent disability as 




Rs.25,200/- per annum.   



                                                                                                        1






        The application of multiplier of 17 by the Tribunal, which was approved 




by the High Court will have to be treated as erroneous in view of the judgment  




in Sarla Verma  v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121.  In para 42  




of   that   judgment,   the   Court   has   indicated   that   if   the   age   of   the   victim   of   an 




accident is 24 years, then the appropriate multiplier would be 18.  By applying 




that multiplier, we hold that the compensation payable to the appellant in lieu of 




the loss of earning would be Rs.4,53,600/-.   










18.     The  award  made  by  the  Tribunal  for   future  medical  expenses   was wholly 




inadequate.     In  Nagappa   v.   Gurudayal   Singh   (2003)   2   SCC   274,   this   Court 




considered  whether  it was permissible  to  award compensation   in  installments  or 




recurring compensation to meet the future medical expenses of the victim.   After 




noticing   the   judgment   of   M.   Jagannadha   Rao,   J.   (as   he   then   was)   in   P. 




Satyanarayana v. I. Babu Rajendra Prasad 1988 ACJ 88 (AP), the judgment of the  




Division   Bench   of   the   Kerala   High   Court   in   Valiyakathodi   Mohd.   Koya   v. 




Ayyappankadu Ramamoorthi Mohan 1991 ACJ 140 (Kerala), this Court observed:








        "In this view of the matter, in our view, it would be difficult to 


        hold that for future medical expenses which are required to be 


        incurred by a victim, fresh award could be passed. However, for 


        such medical treatment, the court has to arrive at a reasonable 


        estimate on the basis of the evidence brought on record. In the 


        present   case,   it   has   been   pointed   out   that   for   replacing   the 


        artificial   leg   every   two   to   three   years,   the   appellant   would  be 



                                                                                                      1






        required   to   have   some   sort   of   operation   and   also   change   the 


        artificial leg. At that time, the estimated expenses for this were 


        Rs 18,000 and the High Court has awarded the said amount. For 


        change   of   the   artificial   leg   every   two   or   three   years   no 


        compensation   is   awarded.   Considering   this   aspect,   if   Rs   one 


        lakh   is   awarded   as   an   additional   compensation,   the   appellant 


        would   be   in   a   position   to   meet   the   said   expenses   from   the 


        interest of the said amount."








After   the   aforesaid   judgment,   the   cost   of   living   as   also   the   cost   of   artificial 




limbs   and   expenses   likely   to   be   incurred   for   periodical   replacement   of   such 




limb has substantially increased.  Therefore, it will be just and proper to award 




a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to the appellant for future treatment.   If this amount is 




deposited in fixed deposit, the interest accruing on it will take care of the cost of 




artificial limb, fees of the doctor and other ancillary expenses.










19.     The   compensation   awarded   by   the   Tribunal   for   pain,   suffering   and 




trauma caused due to the amputation of leg was meager.  It is not in dispute that 




the appellant had remained in the hospital for a period of over three months.  It 




is not possible for the Tribunals and the Courts to make a precise assessment of 




the pain and trauma suffered by a person whose limb is amputated as a result of 




accident.   Even if the victim of accident gets artificial limb, he will suffer from 




different kinds of handicaps and social stigma throughout his life.  Therefore, in 




all such cases, the Tribunals and the Courts should make a broad guess for the 



                                                                                                            1






purpose   of   fixing   the   amount   of   compensation.     Admittedly,   at   the   time   of 




accident, the appellant was a young man of 24 years.  For the remaining life, he  




will suffer the trauma of not being able to do his normal work.   Therefore, we 




feel that ends of justice will be met by awarding him a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- in 




lieu of pain, suffering and trauma caused due to the amputation of leg.




  




20.     The compensation awarded by the Tribunal for the loss of amenities was 




also meager.  It can only be a matter of imagination as to how the appellant will 




have   to   live   for   the   rest   of   life   with   one   artificial   leg.     The   appellant   can   be 




expected to live for at least 50 years.  During this period he will not be able to 




live   like   normal   human   being   and   will   not   be   able   to   enjoy   the   life.     The  




prospects  of  his  marriage   have considerably  reduced.   Therefore,  it would  be 




just   and   reasonable   to   award   him   a   sum   of   Rs.1,50,000/-   for   the   loss   of 




amenities and enjoyment of life.  




  




21.     In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned   judgment   and   the 




award of the Tribunal are set aside.  It is declared that the appellant is entitled to 




total   compensation   of   Rs.9,53,600/-   with   interest   @   7%   per   annum   from   the 




date of filing the claim petition till the date of realization.   The respondent is 




directed   to   pay   the   balance   amount   of   compensation   with   interest   within   a 



                                                                            1






period of three months from today in the form of a Bank Draft prepared in the  




name of the appellant.  








                                           ....................................J.


                                           (G.S. Singhvi)










                                           ....................................J.


                                           (Surinder Singh Nijjar)


New Delhi,


November 01, 2011.


AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW



AVERAGE METHOD OF ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE IS NOT CORRECT. EXPERT OPINION REGARDING TREE VALUES ETC., CAN BE TAKEN IN TO CONSIDERATION WHILE FIXING MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND. - APEX COURT CASE LAW

TNSTC IS THE GOVT. COMPANY - LAND CAN BE ACQUIRED FOR IT


                                                               REPORTABLE










                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA






                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION






                     CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2003










Ramji Veerji Patel & Ors.                                        .... Appellants




                                      Versus




Revenue Divisional Officer & Ors.                                  ....Respondents








                                   JUDGMENT








R.M. Lodha, J. 










              The   appellants   were   unsuccessful   in   challenging   the 




acquisition   of   their   land   before   the   Single   Judge   as   well   as   the 




Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court.   They   are   in   appeal,   by  




special leave. 








2.            On   the   requisition   of   Cholan   Roadways   Corporation 




Limited,   Kumbakonam   (for   short,   `the   Corporation')   for   making 




available   land   for   expansion   of   their   depot,   particularly   for   a 


                                                                                     1



workshop, at Chidambaram, the State Government of Tamil Nadu (for 




short,   `the   Government')   issued   a   notification   under   Section   4(1)   of 




the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894   (for   short,   `the   Act')   which   was  




published   in   the   Gazette   on   March   3,   1989   notifying   for   general  




information   that   the   land   mentioned   therein,   namely,   land 




admeasuring   1.45   acres   comprised   in   T.S.   No.   14,   classified   as 




government wet  land in Chidambaram Municipal Town, South Arcot 




District   was   needed   for     the   above   public   purpose.   The   notification  




under   Section   4(1)   was   also   published   in   the   two   newspapers   on 




November   18,   1988   and   in   the   locality   on   March   27,   1989.   The 




appellants   filed   objections   to   the   acquisition   before   the   Revenue  




Divisional   Officer   (for   short,   `RDO'),   Chidambaram.   The   diverse 




objections   to   the   acquisition   were   raised;   one   of   such   objections  




being   that   the   other   lands   behind   the   existing   depot   of   the 




Corporation   were   available   and   could   be   used   for   the   purpose   for 




which   their   land   was   sought   to   be   acquired.   They   stated   that   their 




family was dependant upon the income from the saw mill existing on 




the land and by compulsory acquisition of their land, they would  be  




deprived of the sole means of livelihood.










                                                                                     2



3.             The RDO considered the objections put forth on behalf of 




the   appellants   and   submitted   his   report   to   the   Government   on 




conclusion of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.








4.             It   appears   that   when   the   report   of   the   RDO   was   under 




consideration,   the   appellants   sent   a   representation   to   the 




Government   bringing   to   its   notice   that   the   land   belonging   to   Tamil  




Nadu Evengelical Lutheran Church (`TELC') just behind the existing 




depot   has   been   advertised   for   sale   and,   therefore,   instead   of 




resorting   to   the   compulsory   acquisition   of   the   appellants'   land,   the 




land of TELC may be acquired.








5.             The   Government   was   not   persuaded   by   the   appellants' 




objections and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued 




which   was   published   in   the   Gazette   on   March   21,   1990.   The 




publication of the Section 6 declaration was  made by other modes as  




well.








6.             The   appellants   challenged   the   notification   under   Section 




4(1)   and   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act   in   the   writ   petition  




before   the   Madras   High   Court.   In   opposition   to   the   writ   petition, 




counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government. The learned 










                                                                                          3



Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition by his order 




dated November 18, 1998.








7.              Against   the   order   of   the   Single   Judge,   the   appellants 




preferred   intra-court   appeal   which   has   been   dismissed   by   the  




impugned order on July 25, 2001.








8.              Mr.   Pallav   Shishodia,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the 




appellants raised two-fold contention. His first contention was that the 




appellants' objections about the availability of land belonging to TELC  




which   is   situated   behind   the   existing   depot   of   the   Corporation   and 




was available for sale were not rationally considered by the RDO and 




the   Government.   He   submitted   that   the   livelihood   of   about   40 




members   of   the   family   was   directly   affected   by   the   compulsory 




acquisition of their land and, therefore, the objections ought to have  




been   considered   in   a   reasonable   manner   more   so   since   the   public 




purpose   for   which   the   appellants'   land   was   sought   to   be   acquired  




could have been easily met by the acquisition of the TELC's land. In  




this   regard,   he   referred   to   three   decisions   of   this   Court,   namely,   (i)  




Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others1, (ii) Hindustan  




Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.  v.  Darius Shapur Chenai and others2  and (iii) 










1 (2000) 7 SCC 296


2  (2005) 7 SCC 627


                                                                                          4



Radhy   Shyam   (Dead)   Through   LRs.   and   others  v.  State   of   Uttar  




Pradesh and Others3.








9.               The second contention of the learned senior counsel for 




the appellants was that the acquisition of the appellants' land by the  




Government   was   for   the   purposes   of   the   Corporation   and   the 




Corporation   being   a   `company'   for   the   purposes   of   the   Act,   the  




procedure   contemplated   in   Part   VII   of   the   Act   was   required   to   be 




mandatorily   followed   and   since   the   said   procedure   has   not   been 




followed,   the   acquisition   is   bad   in   law.   In   this   regard,   Mr.   Pallav 




Shishodia   placed   reliance   upon   a  decision   of   this   Court   in   State   of  




Punjab and Others v. Raja Ram and others4.








10.              On the other hand, Mr. B. Balaji, learned counsel for the 




State   of   Tamil  Nadu  supported  the  view  taken  by  the   Single  Judge  




and   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court.   He   submitted   that   the  




proceedings for acquisition of the appellants' land have been initiated 




and   concluded   in   accordance   with   the   procedure   prescribed   in   the 




Act. There is no illegality in the acquisition of the appellants' land. He  




referred   to   the   counter   affidavit   filed   on   behalf   of   the   Government 




before the High Court in opposition to the writ petition.










3  (2011) 5 SCC 553


4  (1981) 2 SCC 66


                                                                                      5



11.           The   Act   was  enacted  in   1894   for   the   acquisition   of   land 




needed   for   public   purposes   and   for   companies   and   for   determining 




the amount of compensation to be made on such acquisition. The Act 




has undergone some amendments in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1933, 1962, 




1967   and   1984;   the   last   major   amendments   being   by   the   Land  




Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984).








12.           The provisions contained in the Act, of late, have been felt 




by  all   concerned,   do  not  adequately  protect   the   interest  of  the  land  




owners/persons interested in the land. The Act does not provide for  




rehabilitation  of persons  displaced  from  their  land  although  by  such 




compulsory acquisition, their  livelihood  gets  affected. For years,   the 




acquired   land   remains   unused   and   unutilised.   To   say   the   least,   the  




Act has become outdated and needs to be replaced at the earliest by 




fair, reasonable and rational enactment in tune with the constitutional 




provisions,   particularly,   Article   300A   of   the   Constitution.   We   expect 




the law making process for a comprehensive enactment with regard 




to   acquisition   of   land   being   completed   without   any   unnecessary  




delay.








13.           Reverting   back   to   the   Act,   that   Section   5-A   of   the   Act 




confers  a  valuable  right  on  the person  interested  in  any land  which  




has   been   notified   under   Section   4(1)   as   being   needed   for   a   public 


                                                                                     6



purpose or likely to be needed for public purpose is beyond doubt. By 




this right, the owner/person interested may put forth his objections not 




only   in   respect   of   public   purpose   but   also   the   suitability   of   the 




acquisition   in   respect   of   his   land.   The   objector   gets   an   opportunity 




under   Section   5-A   to   persuade   the   Collector   that   his   land   is   not 




suitable for the purpose for which the acquisition is being made or the  




availability   of   other   land   suitable   for   that   purpose.   Section   5-A 




proceedings are two-tier proceedings. In the first step, the objections  




by   the   owner/person   interested   are   heard   by   the   Collector   and   a 




report is submitted to the Government. In the second step, the final  




decision is taken by the Government on the objections so furnished  




by the person interested and the consideration of the report submitted 




by the Collector. 








14.             In  Munshi   Singh   and   others  v.  Union   of   India5,   in 




paragraph 7 of the Report, this Court stated as follows :








           "7.   Section   5-A   embodies   a   very   just   and   wholesome 


           principle   that   a   person   whose   property   is   being   or   is 


           intended   to   be   acquired   should   have   a   proper   and 


           reasonable   opportunity   of   persuading   the   authorities 


           concerned   that   acquisition   of   the   property   belonging   to 


           that  person  should  not be made.  ... The legislature  has, 


           therefore,   made   complete   provisions   for   the   persons 


           interested   to   file   objections   against   the   proposed 


           acquisition   and   for   the   disposal   of   their   objections.   It   is 


           only  in  cases   of   urgency  that  special   powers  have  been 




5  (1973) 2 SCC 337


                                                                                             7



           conferred   on   the   appropriate   Government   to   dispense 


           with the provisions of Section 5-A: "




15.             The above legal position has been reiterated by this Court 




in various decisions including the decisions of this Court in Hindustan  




Petroleum   Corpn.   Ltd.2  and  Radhy   Shyam3  cited   by   Mr.   Pallav 




Shishodia.   In  Hindustan   Petroleum   Corpn.   Ltd.2  ,   this   Court   in 




paragaraph 6 of the Report stated thus :








         "6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a 


         valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought 


         to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained 


         in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of 


         its power  of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right 


         of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same 


         must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation 


         therefor must be paid."




16.             In  Union of India v. Mukesh Hans6, this Court  referred to 




Munshi   Singh5  and   in   paragraph   35   of   the   Report   stated   that   the 




limited right given to the owner/person interested under Section 5-A 




of   the   Act   to   object   to   the   acquisition   proceedings   is   not   an   empty 




formality and is a substantive right.  








17.             As a matter of law, under the Act, the only right that the  




owner/person   interested   has,   is   to   submit   objections   to   the 




compulsory   acquisition   of   his   land   under   Section   5-A.   No   question, 




such   right   and   the   consideration   of   objections   filed   by   the   land-








6 (2004) 8 SCC 14


                                                                                        8



owner/person interested in exercise of such right must be given the 




importance   it   deserves.   The   question   before   us,   is   whether   the 




consideration of  the appellants' objections  to the acquisition of their  




land  by the Government suffers from any illegality or irrationality. 








18.            The   appellants   and   their   family  members   purchased   the 




subject land admeasuring 1.45 acres on January 27, 1981. The said  




land was  agricultural at the time of purchase and was depressed in  




as   much   as   it   was   low   in   level   than   the   main   road.   The   appellants 




incurred   expenditure   in   raising   the   level   of   the   land   and   made 




improvements;   raised   the   building   thereon   and   installed   a   saw   mill 




somewhere in 1986.   In their objections filed on May 24, 1989 before 




the   RDO, the facts concerning the expenditure incurred by them for  




converting   the   agricultural   land   into   building   site;   the   deprivation   of  




their sole means of livelihood and the availability of other  lands were  




stated.     The   objectors   also   stated   that   the   workshop   of   Thanthai 




Periyar   Transport   Corporation   was   originally   put   up   in   Anna 




Kalayarangam   land   owned   by   the   Municipality.     Later,     they   had  




purchased four acres of land comprised in T.S. Nos. 133 and 151 at  




Lal Puram main road, and constructed a workshop and that workshop 




was   functioning.   The   Corporation,   the   objectors   submitted,     can  




acquire any extent of land next to them to construct a workshop.




                                                                                        9



19.            The RDO considered the above objections raised by the 




appellants   and   in   the   proceedings   drawn   on   September   14,   1989  




overruled   the   same.   The   RDO     held   that   when   the   requisitioning  




authority approached TELC  for making available their land, the TELC 




refused   to   sell   the   said   land   and   informed   them   that   they   required 




their   land   for   their   religious   purposes.     The   RDO,   in   this   backdrop,  




observed   that   TELC's     land   cannot   be   acquired   for   the   purpose   of 




expansion of depot. As regards the availability of lands near Thanthai  




Periyar   Transport   Corporation,   the   RDO   observed   that   these   lands 




were one kilometre away from the Corporation's depot and, thus,  the 




land of the appellants alone was suitable for the expansion of depot.  




The RDO, accordingly, forwarded its report to the  Government.








20.            On   October   26,   1989,   TELC   issued   a   public   notice   in   a 




daily newspaper `Dina Malhar' for sale of its land referred to above. 




The appellants sent the copy of the said notice to the   Government. 




However,   the     Government     was   not   persuaded   to   accept   the 




landowners'   objections   and   on   consideration   of   the   RDO's   report 




proceeded   with   the   issuance   and   publication   of   declaration   under 




Section 6 of the Act. 








21.            Mr.   Pallav   Shishodia,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the 




appellants   vehemently   contended   that   the   land   belonging   to   the 


                                                                                       10



TELC   is   suitable   as   that   land   is   situated   just     behind   the   existing 




depot;   the existing depot has already access to the main road from 




Chidambaram to Cuddalore and on  acquisition of the land of TELC, 




the   acquired   land   too   would   have   access   to   the   main   road   through 




the   existing   depot   of   the   Corporation.     He,   thus,   submitted   that  




suitability   aspect   has   not   at   all   been   rationally   considered   by   the  




Government. 








22.            It is difficult to accept the contention of the  learned senior 




counsel for more than one reason. In the first place, in paragraph 5 of  




the counter affidavit filed by the Government before the High Court, 




inter alia, following averment was made:








        ".......The   land   acquired   exists   adjacent   to   the   existing 


        depot   and   it   has   easy   access   to   the   main   road   from 


        Chidambaram   to   Cuddalore   and   it   is   found   to   be   more 


        suitable   in   all   aspects   for   the   expansion   of   the 


        depot.........."




The   above   averment     remains   unrebutted   and   unchallenged   by   the  




appellants as no rejoinder was filed. 








23.            Secondly,     if   the   land   proposed   to   be   acquired   and   the 




alternative   land   suggested   by   the   owners/persons   interested     are 




equally suitable for the purpose for which land is being acquired, the  




satisfaction   of   the   Government,   if   not   actuated   with   ulterior   motive,  






                                                                                       11



must get primacy.  In the judicial review, it is not open to the court to  




examine the aspect of suitability as a court of appeal and substitute  




its opinion.   In any case the present case is not a case where   the  




other   lands   suggested   by   the   appellants   have   been   found   to   be  




equally suitable. The  Government has given reasons  as  to why  the  




appellants' land has been  found to be more suitable for expansion of  




the depot.  The appellants'  land is adjacent to the existing depot   of  




the Corporation having   easy access to the main road. In our view,  




the manner in which the decision has been taken by the  Government  




regarding suitability of the appellants' land for expansion of the depot  




of the Corporation is not vitiated by any error of law nor it is irrational  




or  founded on the extraneous reasons.








24.            Third   and   more     important,     at   the     insistence   of   the  




learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellants,   we     considered   the   site 




plan referred to by him and from a perusal thereof no doubt is left that  




the   land of the appellants is more   suitable than the land of TELC  




situate   behind   the   existing   depot.   TELC   land   has   no   direct   access  




from the Chidambaram to Cuddalore main road. It has access from a 




different   side   road   passing   adjacent   to   the   canal.   The   size   of   the 




TELC's land is also awkward;  it is a long piece of land of which width  




narrows   down   from   175   feet   to   56   feet   west   to   east.   On   the   other  




                                                                                        12



hand,   the   appellants'   land   is   adjacent   on   the   southern   side   to   the 




existing depot and has access from the Chidambaram to Cuddalore 




main road. Having regard to the purpose for which the land is sought 




to be acquired, namely, expansion of existing depot, particularly, for a  




workshop, the appellants' land is definitely more suitable.  Pertinently, 




in   their   objections,   the   appellants   have   not   challenged   the   public 




purpose for  the acquisition of their land.  In what we have  indicated  




above,   it   cannot   be   said   that   suitability     aspect   has   not   been 




reasonably or rationally considered by the  Government.          








25.           Then   comes   the   second   contention   of   Mr.   Pallav 




Shishodia.    He relied upon  the decision of this Court in the case of  




Raja   Ram4      and   submitted   that   the   erstwhile   Corporation   or   the 




successor   Tamil   Nadu   State   Transport   Corporation   (TNSTC)     is   a 




`government   company'   for   the   purposes   of   the   Act     and,   therefore,  




compliance with the provisions of Part VII of the Act had to be made 




in order to lawfully acquire any land for its purpose. In this regard, he 




referred to the averment made in the reply to I.A. No. 3 of 2003 that  




TNSTC   was   the   beneficiary   of   the   acquisition;   it   is   they   who   have 




remitted   the   extent   of   compensation   quantified   by   the   authorities 




under the land acquisition.










                                                                                     13



26.            With   regard   to   the   above   contention   of  Mr.   Pallav 




Shishodia,   it   is   enough   to   say   that   it   overlooks     Section   3(cc)   and 




Section 3(e) of the Act, substituted by Act 68 of 1984. The definition 




of `company' in Section 3(e) after substitution in 1984 is as follows: 








       "S.3(e).-    the expression "company" means--




               (i)      a   company   as   defined   in   section   3   of   the 


                        Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), other than a 


                        Government company referred to in clause (cc);








               (ii)     A   society   registered   under   the   Societies 


                        Registration   Act,   1860   (21   of   1860),   or   under 


                        any   corresponding   law   for   the   time   being   in 


                        force in a State, other than a society referred to 


                        in clause (cc);                




                                                                                                 




               (iii)    A   co-operative   society   within   the   meaning   of 


                        any law relating to co-operative societies for the 


                        time   being   in   force   in   any   State,   other   than   a 


                        co-operative society referred to in clause (cc)".










Section 3(cc) of the Act defines the expression "corporation owned or  




controlled by the State" as follows :








        "S.3(cc).-              the   expression   "corporation   owned   or 


        controlled   by   the   State"   means   any   body   corporate 


        established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, 


        and includes a Government company as defined in section 


        617   of   the   Companies   Act,   1956   (1   of   1956),   a   society 


        registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 


        1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in 


        force   in   a   State,   being   a   society   established   or 


        administered   by   Government   and   a   co-operative   society 




                                                                                                     14



        within   the   meaning   of   any   law   relating   to   co-operative 


        societies  for the time being in force  in any State,  being  a 


        co-operative   society   in   which   not   less   than   fifty-one   per 


        centum of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central 


        Government, or by any State Government or Governments 


        or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or 


        more State Governments;"




27.           That Corporation and the TNSTC fall within the definition 




of Section 3(cc) is not in dispute. Both may not have been divested of  




their   character   as   a   government   company   but   sub-clause   (i)     of 




Section 3(e)   excludes a government company from the definition of 




company.       Part   VII   (Sections   38   to   44B)   of   the   Act   provides   for  




acquisition   of   land   for   companies.   In   view   of   the   definition   of   the 




`company' in Section 3(e) which excludes government company,  the 




Corporation   or   for   that   matter   its   successor   TNSTC   does   not   fall  




within the definition of the `company' and, therefore, is not covered by 




Part VII of the Act at all.




28.           In Raja Ram4,  the definition of `company' in Section 3 (e) 




of the Act prior to its substitution fell for consideration.  The definition 




of `company' under consideration  read as follows :






        "the   expression   "company"   means   a   company   registered 


        under   the   Indian   Companies   Act,   1890   or   under   the 


        (English) Companies Acts, 1862 to 1882 or incorporated by 


        an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian 


        law,  or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a 


        society   registered   under   the   Societies   Registration   Act, 


        1860,   an   a   registered   society   within   the   meaning   of   the 


        Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, or any other law relating 






                                                                                      15



        to cooperative  societies  for the time being  in force  in any 


        State." 








29.           It was in the context of the above definition that  this Court  




held in Raj Ram4  that the Food Corporation of India was not divested 




of   its   character   as   a   company   within   the   meaning   of   definition   of 




clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act.  As noticed above,  the definition of  




`company'   has   undergone     complete   change   and   the     government 




company   has   been   expressly   excluded   from   the   expression 




`company' for the purposes of the Act.  






30.           For the above reasons, it has to be held that Part VII of 




the Act has no application to the present case   as the acquisition of  




land is not  for a `company' as defined in Section 3(e).






31.           Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel also   urged 




that the appellants are migrants from Gujarat.     They have settled in  




Chidambaram about thirty years back and the livelihood of the entire  




family   of   the   appellants   which   comprised   of   about     40   members   is 




dependant   on   the   saw   mill   existing   on   the     subject   land.     Having  




regard to these facts, he would submit that we invoke  our jurisdiction  




under Article 142 of the Constitution and declare the acquisition of the 




appellants' land bad in law to do complete justice.    There is no doubt 




that   by   compulsory   acquisition   of   their   land,     the   appellants   have  






                                                                                    16



been put to hardship.  As a matter of fact, the RDO was alive to this  




problem.   In   his   report   dated   September   14,   1989,   the   RDO     did 




observe that the land owners have spent considerable money to raise 




the level of the land for constructing compound wall and running saw 




mill. He was,  however, of the opinion   that the appellants' land was  




very   suitable   for   the   expansion   of   the   depot   and   the   suitable 




compensation   can   be     paid   to   the   land-owners   to   enable   them   to 




purchase an alternative land. The appellants, however, proceeded to 




challenge the acquisition. The litigation has traversed upto this Court  




and taken about 22 years.   The public purpose has been stalled for  




more than two  decades.   Being the Highest Court, an extraordinary 




power has been conferred on this Court under Article 142 to pass any 




decree,   order   or   direction   in   the   matter   to   do   complete   justice 




between the parties. The power  is plenary in nature and not inhibited  




by constraints or limitations.  However, the power under Article 142 is 




not   exercised   routinely.     It   is   rather   exercised   sparingly   and   very 




rarely.     In   the   name   of   justice   to   the   appellants,   under   Article   142, 




nothing   should   be   done   that   would   result   in   frustrating   the 




acquisition of land which has been completed long back by following  




the   procedure   under   the   Act   and   after   giving   full   opportunity   to   the  




appellants  under Section 5-A.   The possession of the land has also  








                                                                                         17



been taken  as far   back as   on July 25, 2001. The appellants made  




an application (I.A. No. 2 of 2002) for direction to the respondents not  




to interfere with the functioning of the saw mill and permit them to use  




the saw mill but   this Court in its order dated  May 8, 2002  only said 




that   the   saw   mill   shall   not   be   demolished   till   further   orders.   No 




permission was granted to the appellants to use the saw mill. In other  




words,   for   more   than   ten     years   the   saw   mill   is   closed   after 




possession was taken over from the appellants. In the circumstances, 




this   is   not   a     case   fit   for   exercise   of   power   under   Article   142   and  




declare   the   acquisition   of   the   appellants'   land   bad   although   the  




acquisition   proceedings   have   been   completed   in   accordance   with  




law.






32.            Lastly, the learned senior counsel invited our attention to 




the   application   (I.A.   No.   4)   wherein   the   appellants   offered   for 




amicable settlement by expressing their readiness and willingness to 




give an area of land admeasuring 13250 square feet out of the total  




land of 1.45 acres (i.e. 1 acre and 19445 sq. ft.) free of cost to the  




Corporation. The offer is not acceptable to Mr. B. Balaji. He submitted  




that   such   a   small   area   is   of   no   use   for   expansion   of   the   existing  




depot.   We   do   not   find   any  unreasonableness   in   the   submission     of 










                                                                                            18



the counsel   that an area of 13250 square feet would  not meet the 




purpose for which the appellants' land has been acquired.






33.         In view of the above, there is no merit in the appeal and it 




is dismissed. I.A. No. 4 and  other pending applications, if any,  stand 




disposed of. No costs.  










                                                ...........................J


                                                      (R.M. LODHA)  










                                                ......................................J.


                                             (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR )










NEW DELHI


NOVEMBER 2, 2011.                        










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